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THE DUTY TO BE LOYAL
By DEBORAH A. DEMOT*
This essay argues that fiduciary obligation is a distinctive type of obligation. Its
central rationale, nurturing and enforcing commitments to act loyally toward
the interests of others, furnishes limits on the reach of fiduciary obligations.
Attempts to characterize fiduciary obligation as solely a type of contractual
obligation or as a concept best rationalized by the law of torts are
unpersuasive, as are attempts to capture fiduciary obligation within definitions
of altruistic behaviour. The author elaborates these arguments using examples
drawn from partnership and corporate law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What is fiduciary obligation? To what extent is it distinctive?
Does it matter how we answer these questions? Fiduciary obligation is
noteworthy for the broad range of legal contexts in which it plays a role,
for the variable content of the particular duties it imposes, and for the
flamboyant judicial rhetoric it attracts. Trustees, corporate directors,
agents, guardians, attorneys, partners, commercial lenders, marriage
counsellors and spies-only a capacious plot could be inhabited by such
a disparate cast of characters, but all have starred prominently in cases
imposing a duty, of one sort or another, to be loyal to the interests of
another. Not surprisingly to legal theorists, the pervasive reach of
fiduciary obligation, coupled with the variable content of the obligation,
presents a large challenge.
Recent theoretical writing includes a number of ambitious claims
about the nature of the obligation and about its proper categorization
within schemes of legal concepts and obligations. The claims are claims
about taxonomy. They attempt to answer the question, "What sort of
beast is this?" Questions of taxonomy are basic to much legal
argumentation, as they are to the work of other intellectual disciplines.
Taxonomy is the process of classifying particular types of things into
general categories, categories constructed with some purpose or system
in mind.
This essay explores the challenge to legal taxonomy posed by
fiduciary obligation. After examining the respective claims of altruism
and contract to capture fiduciary norms, the essay examines distinctions
between conventional fiduciary norms and norms derived from tort law.
The essay then explores a few practical implications of decisions about
classification. For concrete illustrations, the essay draws on current
disputes concerning partnership law and corporate law. The essay
concludes by explaining the limited usefulness and persuasiveness in law
of a style of argument it describes as taxonomic. In general, the essay
argues that fiduciary obligation is a distinctive type of obligation with
characteristics and limits derived from 'its principal rationale. That
rationale is nurturing and enforcing commitments to act loyally toward
the interests of others. These commitments frequently follow from the
long-settled legal consequences of choosing a particular structure, like a
trust or a corporation, for a transaction or relationship.
[VOr. 30 No. 2
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A few initial points about taxonomy may be helpful. Common
though questions of taxonomy are, disciplines differ in their tactics for
answering them. Taxonomic decisions in botany and zoology place
species (and subspecies within species) into established categories
designed to show the potential relationships among dissimilar types of
organisms. The starting point in taxonomic biology is the species,
organized in turn into larger groups or genera, and still more generally
organized by analogous genera to form orders and classes. Likewise,
work in molecular biology begins by identifying individual genes and
mapping sequences among them. Biologists, in short, begin with the
particular, the individual species in botany and zoology, and move
upward toward the general. Legal taxonomists, in contrast, appear to,
begin with judgments about general and abstract starting points, which
in turn dictate the placement of particulars.
Moreover, decisions in biological taxonomy begin with
descriptions of a species' observable traits. In zoology, for purposes of
taxonomy, the basic characteristics of mammals are their teeth and toes,
and for birds, their beak shape. Legal taxonomy, as we shall shortly see,
often seems to turn much less on the description of observed reality than
on a priori classifications. To be sure, the designation of specific
characteristics, like teeth and toes, as central for purposes of
classification in turn reflects pre-empirical assumptions.1 Perhaps the
relative strength and pervasiveness of pre-empirical assumptions are
more precise points of distinction between law and biology.
Legal taxonomy has concrete consequences that further
differentiate it from taxonomic work in biology. Whether a particular
type of event constitutes a tort as opposed to a contract matters greatly:
among other consequences, remedies and limitations periods are apt to
differ depending on how the event is classified. 2 In biology, in contrast,
I Pre-empirical assumptions reflect judgments about a discipline's purpose, about its
formulation of problems and about its criteria for deciding when those problems have been solved.
These assumptions "cannot be demonstrated empirically because they determine the rules for
collecting and applying empirical data in the first place." E.L. Rubin, "Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes" (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 at
3.
2 Thoughtful scholars address these questions of classification in carefully nuanced style.
Recently, for example, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman advocated the abolition of limited
shareholder liability for tort claims but urged its retention for contract claims. See H. Hansmann &
R. Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts" (1991) 100 Yale L.J.
1879. To differentiate tort from contract claims, Hansmann and Kraakman suggest courts should
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taxonomic decisions matter, but fewer practical consequences turn on
them.
How does it matter whether the giant panda (Ailuropoda
melanoleuca) is better classified as a bear or as a raccoon? However
classified, giant pandas would continue to be rotund beasts with black
and white fur and a taste for eating bamboo. To species members in the
wild, the classification question seems not to matter at all, unless
conservation programs are more intense for beasts classified as bears
than for raccoons. For zoo-resident giant pandas, the question may
matter more: zookeepers might decide that giant pandas should be
housed near their smaller raccoon relatives, amid the smaller mammals,
rather than in the bears' domain. Children and nostalgic adults,
moreover, may be disappointed to learn that their favourite toy was not
a bear after all. Indeed, one reference work resolves these problems by
deeming the giant panda an "aberrant bear" of the family Ursidae.
3
Other zoologists classify the giant panda as an aberrant raccoon,4 in
colloquial terms a raccoon with an attitude.
Like the giant panda, fiduciary obligation is difficult to classify
and, unless one is willing to ignore various observed traits, arguably
"aberrant" however or wherever it is situated in a taxonomic scheme.
Like a contract, fiduciary obligation usually-but not always-follows a
voluntary association, and frequently an express agreement, among
parties. Remedies for breach of the fiduciary's duty to be loyal,
however, often differ from the remedies available for breach of contract.
evaluate "whether the victim was able, prior to the injury, to assess the risks she took in dealing with
the firm and to decline to deal if those risks seemed excessive in comparison with the net advantages
she otherwise derived from the transaction." Ibid at 1921. Victims who proceeded into a
transaction "in substantial awareness of the risks of injury involved" should be treated as contract
claimants. Ibid. See also ibid, n. 107, where the authors write that the question of risk-awareness
"should not be generally asked of each individual victim, but rather for categories of victims."
3 Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 9 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1987) at 109.
4 Britannica acknowledges that the other species called a "panda," the Himalayan panda
(Ailunsfulgens), is unquestionably a raccoon. See ibid. Other authorities also treat the giant panda
as a major taxonomic challenge but resolve the question differently. The Encyclopedia of Mammals
locates the giant panda within the raccoon family, to which it assigns two subfamilies: Allurinae
(herbivorous pandas) and Procyonidae (the other fifteen omnivorous species of raccoons).
Raccoons descended from Canidae, the dog family. With the exception of the giant panda,
raccoons have ringed tails; all raccoons except coatis and giant pandas are nocturnal. See D.
Macdonald, ed., Encyclopedia of Mammals (New York: Facts on File, 1984). In contrast, another
authority notes the giant panda's superficial resemblance to a bear and suggests that it "may be a
true member of the Ursidae." See McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, vol. 13
(New York. McGraw-Hill, 1987) at 74-75.
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Indeed, courts acknowledge that in some fiduciary settings remedies
have a deterrent purpose which at times justifies the inclusion of a
punitive or exemplary component. Fiduciary obligation is often
mandatory, a trait discussed later in this essay, which seems at odds with
the stereotypic concern of contract law. That is, the content of
contractual obligation is, for the most part, chosen by the parties to the
contract.
Moreover, if the parties' relationship will carry fiduciary
consequences, the legal rules applicable to the parties' negotiations
differ from the legal regulation of pre-formation behaviour incident to
ordinary commercial contracts. In negotiations leading to an ordinary
commercial contract, parties may not lie to each other and may not
actively conceal material facts from each other's investigation. But they
need not be candid with each other. In contrast, parties negotiating to
form a partnership-by virtue of which they will owe each other
fiduciary duties-are obliged to be candid with each other during the
negotiations; that is, to disclose honestly all facts related to the
prospective partnership and its property.5
Further complicating the taxonomist's task, the history of
fiduciary language and norms is traceable to the trust and to the
inhibitions equity courts imposed on trustees in their dealings with trust
property and with the trust's beneficiaries. Not all fiduciaries, however,
are under inhibitions and duties identical to those of the trustee.
Corporate directors, for example, may self-deal in ways that trustees may
not. In any event, the basic taxonomic distinction used to classify the law
of private obligations, the distinction between obligations voluntarily
assumed and those imposed by law, was developed by jurists and
academics who paid little attention to the place and significance of the
law of trusts and other creatures of equity. As Professor Patrick Atiyah
describes these taxonomists' work, "nobody seems to have troubled
overmuch about the place of equitable obligations in the great divide
between voluntarily assumed and legally-imposed obligations."
6
5 As a corollary, protecting pre-contractual disclosure of proprietary information does not
present the problems between prospective partners that it does in the context of the ordinary
commercial contract. See G.R. Shell, "Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial
Contracts: Toward a New Tort Cause of Action" (1991) 44 Vand. L. Rev. 221 at 236-39.
6 P.S. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 193 at
1992]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Beyond these basic taxonomic problems, fiduciary obligation is
paradoxical in some respects. Major sectors of significant economic
activity in the United States feature decision makers governed by
fiduciary norms, however construed. Trustees of private employers'
employee benefit plans, when making decisions concerning plan assets,
are subject to express fiduciary standards set forth in the EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY Acr OF 1974. 7 Indeed, by 1989 (the most
recent year of availability for this particular statistic), private pension
plans held assets worth 1,986.3 billion dollars.8 Additionally, corporate
directors have long been characterized as occupying a fiduciary position,
which, unsurprisingly, has generated an enormous volume of case-law
defining the particular significance in various contexts of fiduciary
inhibitions on directors. In other respects as well, case-law continues to
develop and interpret fiduciary norms with vigour. In current litigation
between lenders and borrowers, some courts have been willing to hold
the lender to a fiduciary standard in evaluating its decisions that are
adverse to the borrower's interests, especially when the lender has been
a source of pervasive advice concerning the borrower's business or has
effectively monopolized the borrower's access to credit markets.9
For some observers, however, fiduciary obligation seems an
anachronism, a fusty relic of an earlier era, evoking more the world of
Bleak House1 ° than that of The Bonfire of the Vanities.11 Fiduciary roles
and values seem embodied in Mr. Jarndyce, the troubled but exemplary
guardian in Bleak House, 12 but not in Sherman McCoy, the Master of the
Universe in The Bonfire of the Vanities.
13
The language of fiduciary obligation itself is paradoxical,
combining to an unusual degree perceived power with apparent
7 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1990) [hereinafter E.R.I.S.A.].
8 Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990) Table 795.
9 See, eg., People's Bank & Trust Co. of CedarRapids v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa Ct. App.
1986); and W.H. Lawrence, "Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated With
Application To the Relational Theory of Secured Financing" (1989) 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387.
10 C. Dickens, Bleak House (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
11 T. Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988).
12 Supra, note 10.
13 Supra, note 11.
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imprecision. The defendant in litigation over fiduciary issues stands
accused, in effect, of betraying others' trust. Courts writing opinions
enthusiastically respond to the rhetorical stakes exemplified by Judge
Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon14 to hold fiduciaries to "a punctilio of an
honour the most sensitive."15 Particularized into rules, fiduciary norms
are, in contrast, elusive and apparently variable. Indeed, fiduciary norms
mean different things in different contexts. As applied to a trustee, the
duty to be loyal substantially limits the trustee's ability to purchase trust
property. The trustee's purchase without the beneficiary's informed
consent is a breach of the trustee's duty. Even if the beneficiary
consents, and his or her consent is fully informed, the beneficiary is
bound to the bargain with the trustee only if its terms are "fair and
reasonable."'16 Corporate directors, in contrast, enjoy much wider
latitude in dealings with the corporation and its property. Directors who
are not themselves parties to the transaction may, if appropriately
informed, approve the transaction and bind the corporation to it.17
II. THE CLAIMS OF ALTRUISM
Whatever fiduciary obligation may mean in particular settings, in
general, a person subject to the obligation must act to serve the interests
of another person, the beneficiary of the obligation, within the scope of
their relationship. Thus, the obligation requires the person subject to it
to sacrifice the immediate pursuit of self-interest, especially when that
pursuit conflicts with the beneficiary's interests.
As some legal theorists define altruism, fiduciary obligation
requires those subject to it to act altruistically. Professor Duncan
Kennedy defines altruism broadly:
The essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not to indulge a sharp preference for
one's own interest over those of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share,
and to be merciful ... Sacrifice is the dynamic notion of taking action that will change an
14 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
15 IbiL at 464.
16 RsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 216 (1959).
1 7 See, eg., REVIsED MODEL BusIwNss CORP. Acr § 8.61 & § 8.62 (1989).
1992]
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ongoing course of events, at some expense to oneself, to minimize another's loss or
mamize his gain.
8
By definition, then, a person acting to further another's interests is
acting altruistically.
As applied to fiduciary obligation, the breadth of Professor
Kennedy's definition of altruism seems highly nondescriptive of many
phenomena which it includes. Suppose the relationship in question is
one between commercially sophisticated and wary parties-perhaps a
partnership formed for the purpose of commercial real estate
development. Such parties are likely to be animated in their business
dealings by the pursuit of self-interest, a motivation likely to pervade the
formation of their partnership. Indeed, it would be surprising if these
parties failed to pursue self-interest in negotiating the terms of their
partnership agreement. Likewise, after the partnership is formed, self-
interest is likely to animate partners' proposals to modify their
agreement and partners' bargaining to obtain fellow partners' assent to
self-favouring modification proposals.1 9 Although partnership law in
defined ways constrains self-interested acts through the fiduciary rubric,
partners in commercial real estate projects tend not to exhibit either the
motivation or behaviour typically thought to be altruistic. Indeed, some
partnerships may be composed of members who realize that their self-
interest in the long run will be furthered by co-operative behaviour in
the short run. That realization, however, is not an impulse toward
altruism.
Moreover, the broad definition of altruism ignores the point that
the duty to act loyally is one imposed by the law in particular
relationships (almost always relationships voluntarily entered into by the
person subject to the obligation)2 0 In contrast, in its conventional sense,
altruistic action is self-willed, not compelled by law, as illustrated by the
absence of a legal duty to undertake the rescue of other persons who are
18 D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685 at 1717.
19 See R.W. Hillman, "Private Ordering Within Partnerships" (1989) 41 U. Miami L Rev. 425
at 465-66.
20 A constructive trust, especially if it is viewed as a remedial device rather than the product of
a prior undertaking by the defendant, is a counter-example. See RESrATEMENT OF REmTTTON
§ 160 (1937).
[VOL 30 No. 2
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strangers to the potential rescuer 1 Defining altruism so broadly also
slights the differences between parties' reasons for entering into a
relationship-which may be self-interested in the extreme-and the
norms thereafter applicable to the relationship-which may be norms of
co-operation or loyalty. The point bears repetition that self-interested
parties may perceive that a relationship requiring co-operation or more,
loyalty, may in the long run be more profitable to its individual
participants. 22
Fiduciary obligation also presupposes that the fiduciary's loyalty
has a defined focus-a beneficiary-to be served.2 3 Although altruists
ignore self, they do so not necessarily to further the interest of a defined
object or a specific person. Similarly, loyalty to one beneficiary
precludes equally faithful service to another beneficiary with conflicting
interests. In prosaic terms, a fiduciary gets one dog in each fight,
whereas an altruist is not so limited.
The austere exclusivity of fiduciary commitment troubles some
legal theorists. Recently, Professor Lawrence Mitchell advocated the
creation of fiduciary duties to be owed by a corporation's management
to holders of debt securities issued by the corporation (but not
necessarily to the corporation's other creditors)? 4 Professor Mitchell
acknowledges that, under present law, the ultimate beneficiaries of
managers' fiduciary duties to a corporation are its stockholders. He
objects, instead, to managers' ability to benefit stockholders through
transactions that disappoint bondholders but do not breach
bondholders' contractually defined rights.25 But sometimes the interests
of any business's creditors may conflict with the interests of its equity
21 See J.M. Adler, "Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations
About the Current State of Common Law Duties to Aid or Protect Others" (1991) Wis. L. Rev. 867
at 872.
22 See C.P. Gillette, "Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for
Remote Risks" (1990) 19 J. Legal Stud. 535 at 540.
23 Professor Mitchell, whose analysis emphasizes the fiduciary's conduct rather than the
beneficiary's interest, also recognizes that "[o]bviously the reason that the fiduciary principle exists
is to protect the interests of the beneficiary." See L.E. Mitchell, "A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes" (1992) 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579 at 597 n. 92.
2 4 L.E. Mitchell, "The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders" (1990) 65 N.Y.U. L Rev.
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owners. Whether to expand the business, to engage in risky business
transactions and to distribute, rather than retain earnings are often
questions on which creditors' preferences may diverge from those of
owners2 6 How can the same managers have a fiduciary level of devotion
to both creditor and owner interests? Outside insolvency, present law
may well require directors to be less than generous with debtholders if
that treatment advances shareholders' interests.27 Once the business
approaches insolvency, creditors' and shareholders' interests are likely to
diverge even more sharply. Prior to the point of actual insolvency, once
the business enters "the vicinity of insolvency," the Delaware Court of
Chancery recently held that directors owe their duties to "the corporate
enterprise," not only or merely the corporation's shareholders 28 To say
that under exigent circumstances directors owe duties to an entity,
however, is far different from saying directors have a fiduciary duty-let
alone an enforceable one-to the enterprise's creditors.
Most theorists, to be sure, recognize the paramount nature of
common shareholders' interests-at least in the long term-over the
26 See T.R. Hurst & LJ. McGuinness, "The Corporation, the Bondholder, and Fiduciary
Duties" (1991) 10 J. L & Com. 187 at 204.
2 7 In evaluating the primacy of shareholders' interests, it is important to keep in mind the
breadth and strength of the Ameiican business judgment rule, which broadly shields the decisions of
disinterested directors from judicial scrutiny of the decisions' merits and shields the directors
themselves from personal liability. In John Hancock Capital Growth Management, Inc. v.Aris Corp.,
1990 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 95,461 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,1990), Texstyrene Corporation's directors
rejected an inexpensive bond repurchase-at a 25% discount-in favour of a more expensive
restructuring of the debt to facilitate a sale of Texstyrene's assets to another corporation. The
Court held that since a majority of Texstyrene's directors did not have a selfish interest in rejecting
the inexpensive bond repurchase, the business judgment rule applied to the directors' decision.
The business judgment rule, however, applies only to directors who make an informed
judgment. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The corporation statute in
Delaware, as in many other states, permits a corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation
a provision exculpating directors from liability for money damages for acts of gross negligence. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
Shareholder interests are entitled to primacy when the corporation's directors abandon its
future prospect of continued existence. If directors initiate an active bidding process to sell the
company or a reorganization entailing a break up of its assets, shareholders' intents must be
paramount. See MillsAcquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). Shareholders'
interests also must trump those of other constituencies when directors respond to a hostile takeover
with a defensive strategy involving a break up of the corporation. See Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Tune Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
28 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150 Civ.,
slip op. at 34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,1991).
[voL. 30 NO. 2
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interests of the other claimants. 29 Other claimants' interests, unlike
equity shareholders' residual interests, are more amenable to protection
through other devices, like express agreements. Indeed, courts tend to
resolve conflicts between the rights of preferred stockholders and those of
common stockholders by limiting preferred stockholders' fiduciary
claims to rights created expressly or impliedly by the instrument under
which the preferred stock was issued.30 The issuer's directors are free to
treat redeemable preferred stock as a loan to be repaid or refunded, and
to make the redemption decision to further the interests of common
stockholders2 l In contrast, common stockholders are residual claimants
whose interests resist advance specification. 32
Somewhat at odds with the tradition of common shareholders'
primacy, several states recently enacted statutes permitting, and in some
instances requiring, directors to consider the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies, including employees, creditors, consumers
and local communities in which the corporation operates its business.
Although support for these statutes is traceable to concern about hostile
takeovers, not all of the statutes are limited to the decisions of directors
of a target corporation confronted with an unwanted bid.3 3 The
practical effect of these statutes is open to question because for the most
29 See, eg., PRINCIPLES OF COR'ORATE Gov .NANCE § 2.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992),
which provide that a corporation's objective should be to conduct business activities "with a view to
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain"; but see M. Lipton & SA. Rosenblum, "A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors" (1991) 58 U. Cli. L.
Rev. 187 at 204-05. Here, Lipton and Rosenblum contend that there is no intrinsic reason that
"conformity to the wishes of the stockholders must be the central goal of the corporation." In
Canada, these lines of demarcation seem to be drawn with a duller instrument. The scope of
interests protected by statutory oppression remedies-including creditors' interests-is one basis for
the contrast. See, generally, D.A. DeMott, "Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative
Assessment of Canadian Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents"
(forthcoming, Autumn 1992) 35 Law & Contemp. Probs.
30 See Hurst & McGuinness, supra, note 26 at 205.
31 See E.M. Dodd, Jr., "Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares"
(1941) 89 U. Pa. L Rev. 697 at 724-25.
32 See R.B. Thompson, "The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation" (1990) 15 J. Corp.
L. 377 at 407. Thompson describes the risks associated with drafting fully contingent contracts
where these contracts must cover the risks of managerial misconduct that arise from breaches of
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The imposition of mandatory legal rules turns on "the relative
strength of alternative constraints on management conduct."
33 See WJ. Carney, "Does Defining Constituencies Matter?" (1990) 59 U. Cin. L Rev. 385 at
424 n. 157.
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part they do not enable non-shareholders to sue.34 At most, the
constituency consideration statutes provide a defence--of a weight yet to
be determined by litigation-to directors sued by shareholders.
The larger question raised by constituency statutes is, in weaker
form, the same question raised by proposals to create additional
fiduciary obligations to be owed by directors to non-shareholder
interests. Is duty diffused likely to become duty denied? Having
inconsistent focal points for one's loyalty inexorably undermines one's
accountability to any set of interests other than one's own.35
I1. OF REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTS
• Broad definitions of contract-capturing fiduciary obligation and
virtually all institutions of private law-also abound in recent
scholarship. Professors Alan Bromberg and Larry Ribstein write in their
treatise on partnership law:
Fiduciary duties are essentially part of the standard form contract that governs
partnership in the absence of contrary agreement... Because the parties cannot anticipate
all problems that may arise during the course of their relationship, and because dealing
with all these problems contractually would be quite costly, the law supplies general terms
to fill in the interstices.36
In short, fiduciary norms are default rules whose interstitial character
justifies their imposition when the parties' express agreement is
incomplete. According to Professors Bromberg and Ribstein, the law's
choice of a default rule should replicate "what the partners would have
been likely to agree to in the absence of transactions costs, in light of
34 Ibid. at 424, and see C. Hansen, "Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective"
(1991) 46 Bus. Law. 1355 at 1372.
35 See J. Biancalana, "Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong
Question" (1990) 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 425 at 441-42. Here, Biancalana notes that managerialism
-which places managers in central roles and authorizes them to consider the interests of all groups
-uses language of trusteeship but imposes no enforceable duties on anyone. See also M.A.
O'Connor, "Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to
Protect Displaced Workers" (1991) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 at 1233. The author argues that
constituency statutes create risks that "directors may hide behind vague duties to conflicting groups
to serve their own interests."
36 A. Bromberg & L Ribstein, Partnership (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1988) at 6:68-69.
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practical considerations and the other elements of the partnership
relationship."3 7
As a criterion for specifying the contents of default rules, what-
the-parties-would-have-agreed-to has an initial and obvious appeal. The
standard defers to the parties' own wishes, or, more precisely, their
wishes had they addressed the issue resolved by the rule. Implementing
the would-have-agreed-to criterion is difficult however. Is the criterion
addressed to the agreement to be reached, hypothetically, between
particular parties? If so, the content of the agreement will reflect the
outcomes of the parties' bargaining. A party's skill in bargaining and the
intensity with which she or he wishes to conclude a deal are likely to
affect the outcome. Indeed, nothing in the agreement the parties would
actually reach, if they bargained over the point, might resemble fiduciary
obligation. Perhaps the criterion instead looks to the agreement that
reasonable parties would reach, and makes no assumptions about their
relative bargaining strength or the relative intensity of their desires to
close a deal. If so, the content of the default rule seems simply to be a
mandatory legal rule detached in content from the results of party
bargaining.
The most plausible interpretation of the would-have-agreed-to
criterion is that it means the contract terms which would be insisted
upon by a reasonable person who recognizes himself or herself to be
vulnerable to the other party in the relationship. The reasonable person
who is self-aware of his or her own vulnerability might indeed bargain
for fiduciary-like constraints on the other party.3 8 And a reasonable
person, self-aware of his or her own vulnerability, might bargain for the
chief practical consequence of fiduciary protection, which is to trigger an
opportunity for judicial review of the other party's actual behaviour and
of the advantages gained through it. Ex ante, in short, this sort of
reasonable person might well bargain for ex post review of the
relationship's subsequent history. Just how much the reasonable person
understands about his own vulnerability is an intriguing and open
question. Suppose the reasonable person considers making an
371bid. at 6:69.
38 Similarly, in describing the rules they believe should apply to lawyers, lay persons frequently
picture themselves as clients and wish their lawyer to be their uncritical hired gun, bound by a norm
of absolute confidentiality to clients. See T. Schneyer, "Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun" (1991)
4J. Legal Educ. 11 at 13 n. 11.
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investment as a minority shareholder in a corporation. Is the reasonable
person aware that the controlling shareholders, who will be in
operational control of the corporation, are likely to possess an inevitable
superiority of insight into the company's future?39
Ironically, some theorists use the contract classification so
broadly that the consequences resemble the diffusion of loyalty favoured
by altruism's advocates. Professors Schleifer and Summers argue that
non-shareholder constituents have entered into "implicit contracts,"
based on trust, that supplement or supersede the constraints imposed by
any express contracts between the corporation and the particular
constituent. Thus, the corporation's implicit contract with its employees
limits its right to terminate them because employees invest effort in
learning about their particular employer and its business on the faith
that their employment will continue.40 Of course, not all implicit
contracts, as defined, appear to be efficient; "implicit contract" seems
like a handy justification for any perquisite. Even determining the terms
of an "implicit contract" in a fashion satisfactory to a lawyer is difficult.
Do implicit contracts contain conditions? May they be modified? Are
they subject to a parol evidence rule?
The mandatory components of fiduciary rules also challenge the
descriptive accuracy of characterizing them as interstitial default rules.
By definition, a default rule is inapplicable to the extent the parties
agree otherwise. To be sure, contract law itself includes mandatory rules
not subject to being trumped or ousted by the parties' agreement
otherwise. Contract law does not enforce promises made without
consideration, at least in the absence of detrimental reliance on the
promise, even if the promisor expressly acknowledged the absence of any
anticipated benefit. Formal requirements, such as the Statute of
Frauds,41 likewise are mandatory, as is the substantive doctrine of
unconscionability. Articles One and Two of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
39 The majority's informational advantage does not presuppose that it manipulates, withholds,
or misstates material information. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolour, Inc., 582 A.2d 1182, 1187 n. 8
(Del. 1988). Here, the Court stated that "the majority may have insight into their company's future
based primarily on bits and pieces of nonmaterial information that have value as a totality"
(emphasis in original).
40 See A. Schleifer & L. Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers" in A. Auerbach,
ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988)
33 at 38.
4 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNiMncrs § 110 (1981).
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CODE4 2 contain additional illustrations of mandatory rules. Under
Article One, the duties of good faith imposed by the u.cc_ may not be
eliminated through the parties' agreement, although those duties may be
defined by standards in agreements if the standards are not "manifestly
unreasonable. '43 Moreover, while Article Two permits parties
considerable flexibility in designing and specifying their own choices of
remedies, it requires that, in all instances, there be "some minimum
remedy for breach."44
The degree to which particular fiduciary rules are mandatory
varies enormously. On the heavily mandatory end of the spectrum are
rules requiring candour. Consider again the partnership rule treating
partners as fiduciaries. Under section 20 of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT,45 each partner has a duty to account to the partnership for profits
derived without fellow partners' consent "from any transaction
connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property."46 Courts interpret section 20 to
require candid disclosure of dealings and interests related to the
business of the prospective partnership. 47 Professors Bromberg and
Ribstein explain that, prior to executing a partnership agreement, a rule
of candour is justified because "it will be difficult for the parties to build
a relationship based on trust if they must deal with each other skeptically
at the outset."4 Is a duty to be candid intelligible if it is characterized as
a default rule? If a party negotiating to form a partnership expressly
waives his right to know material information that is in his prospective
partner's possession, would the waiver be effective? The person who
executed the waiver, without knowing the information possessed by the
other person, would be unable to evaluate the magnitude and
significance of the information. True, he might arguably be proceeding
in full knowledge of his ignorance, but that realization does not provide
42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1989) [hereinafter U.C.C.].
43 1Wbid § 1-102(3).
44 bid. § 2-719, Official Comment 1.
45 6 U.LA. 256 (1981).
46 bkid. § 21(1).
4 7 See, for example, Libby v. L. Corp., 247 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
48 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, note 36 at 6:63.
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a concrete basis on which to assess the risks of proceeding further with
the other party.*
In contrast, fiduciary rules that regulate behaviour seem more
like default rules. Partners are free to consent in the partnership
agreement to a partner's right to purchase partnership property, thereby
ousting the default rule requiring consent specific to the transaction
from each partner.49 The purchasing partner, however, must disclose all
material information to fellow partners and, according to the leading
case, must pay the property's fair value to the partnership.5 0 Even if the
partnership agreement expressly provides that the terms of the purchase
shall be determined "in the sole discretion" of the purchasing partner,sl
the purchasing partner must pay fair value. Thus, partnership law
appears also to embody a strong mandatory norm against expropriation
of partnership property.
A recent amendment to Delaware's version of the zEvisED
UNIFORM LMnIa PARTNERSm AcP52 creates a number of difficult questions
about the force of the anti-expropriation norm. In 1990, Delaware
amended its version of the R.U.LP.A. to provide that
[t]o the extent that, at law or equity, a partner has duties (including fiduciary duties) and
liabilities relating thereto to a limited partnership or to another partner, (1) any such
partner acting under a partnership agreement shall not be liable to the limited
partnership or to any such other partner for the partner's good faith reliance on the
provisions of such partnership agreement, and (2) the partner's duties and liabilities may
be expanded or restricted by provisions in a partnership agreement. 53
As written, the Delaware addition to the R.U.L.PA. permits the limited
partnership agreement to specify exclusively the general partner's duties
to the partnership and to its limited partners. It also permits exculpatory
49 See Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter O'Leaiy]. In the
absence of such a provision, a partner wishing to purchase partnership property must, at a
minimum, inform his fellow partner of that fact, even when the property is sold at an open auction.
See Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982). This case involved an auction sale of a
thoroughbred horse owned by the partnership.
50 'Leary, ibi. at 1210.
51 Ibid. at 1209. See also Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Il. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
550 N.E.2d 557 (MI1. 1990), which held that a general partner's right to use "sole discretion" in
making distributions to limited partners does not immunize its decisions from judicial scrutiny
under a fiduciary standard.
52 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, c. 17 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter R.U.LP.A.].
53 1bid, § 17-1101(d).
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provisions to be operative in limited partnership agreements well beyond
the effective scope of exculpation for corporate directors under
Delaware law.5 4 The Delaware corporation statute permits only the
elimination or reduction of directors' liability for money damages for
breaches of the duty of care they owe to the corporation.5 In contrast,
Delaware's addition to the R.U.LP.A., on its face, permits restrictions on a
partner's duties of loyalty.
It is not clear how the Delaware statute would affect common
provisions in limited partnership agreements, and how it would resolve
common disputes among partners. If the limited partnership agreement
permits the general partner to purchase partnership property on such
terms as it determines in its sole discretion, is the general partner free to
pay less than fair market value? Does the statute exclude challenges to
the general partner's use of its discretion that are based on
unconscionability? Is the general partner relying in good faith on the
agreement's sole discretion provision if it pays nothing? Or next to
nothing? And in litigation brought by limited partners against a
purchasing general partner, who has the burden on the question of good
faith reliance?
Less mandatory, it seems, is the fiduciary norm forbidding a
partner's competition with the partnership. Ordinarily partners may not
compete with the partnership, even while it is in the process of
dissolving.5 6 One court upheld a clause in the partnership agreement of
an oil production group providing that each partner "shall be free to
enter into business and other transactions for his or her own separate
individual account, even though such business or other transaction may
be in conflict with and/or competition with the business of this
partnership."'5 7 The scope of activity that is privileged by a free to
compete clause is not limitless, however. A free to compete clause, for
54 Whether such flexibility is tolerable in the limited partnership setting is open to dispute.
Compare Thompson, supra, note 32 at 409-10, which observes that possibilities for abuse are limited
by the tax-driven nature of investment in many limited partnerships; and D.S. Reynolds, "Loyalty
and the Limited Partnership" (1985) 34 U. Kan. L Rev. 1 at 32-33. Reynolds suggests that a lack of
intimacy between limited partners and a general partner makes it hard to argue that limited
partners' assent to general exculpatory language constitutes assent to general partners' specific self-
dealing transactions.
55 Delaware General Corporation Law, DEFL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
56 SeeMonin v. Monin, 785 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
5 7 See Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766,768 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
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example, does not permit a partner to use confidential information
acquired from the partnership to advantage the partner over the
partnership in competing for the same business opportunity5 8 Indeed, if
the free to compete clause expressly encompassed and allowed the use
of confidential information in ways detrimental to the partnership, the
partner using the information would be under an obligation to
compensate the partnership for the value of the information, which is
partnership property.
IV. ENCROACHMENTS FROM TORT
The mandatory nature of some fiduciary norms raises the
question whether fiduciary doctrines might best be regarded as a
specialized province of tort law, which, in general, is the private law
domain of legally imposed duties. This taxonomic decision would carry
significant consequences. In particular, standards for liability derived
from tort often turn on the defendant's motivation, at least in the case of
intentional torts. Fiduciary standards, in contrast, conventionally
operated independently of the defendant's subjective motivation even
when the defendant's account of that motivation was credible.
Fiduciaries who created a conflict between their self-interest and their
beneficiary's interest breached the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary,
however well-motivated the fiduciary's conduct might have been.
Indeed, as in Boardman v. Phipps,59 liability attached to fiduciaries who
acted, in the circumstances, in ways many people would consider to be
reasonable.
Additionally, the basic rationale of tort law is to compensate
people for injuries inflicted upon them and for losses they have suffered.
In contrast, a fiduciary's liability is often to account for profit realized by
the fiduciary when the fiduciary's conduct has not inflicted an injury on
anyone. Many instances of fiduciary liability are geared to produce
restitution of a benefit obtained by the fiduciary, not compensation for a
58 See Tn-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 216 Cal. App. 3d
1139, 1152, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330, 336 (1989), review denied, Apr. 4, 1990. A separate question is
whether the partner planning to compete must disclose his plan to do so, and if so, when. If asked,
may the partner lie about the plan? See, generally, Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 535
N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989).
59 [1966] 3 All E.R. 721 (H.L.).
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loss suffered by the beneficiary, if the beneficiary chooses to pursue the
restitutionary remedy. Compensation as a remedy for breach of
fiduciary obligation is, however, well established as an alternative
remedy.60 Demarcating the outer limits of the fiduciary's liability to
compensate for loss requires at least a presumptive theory of fiduciary
obligation, a rationale for its imposition.
To be sure, if the plaintiff elects to seek compensation, difficult
issues may arise given sufficiently remarkable sequences of facts.
Suppose a fiduciary breaches a duty of loyalty to his or her beneficiaries,
a breach unbeknownst to beneficiaries until they have proceeded into a
transaction and suffered substantial loss. The loss, in turn, would not
have been suffered by the beneficiaries had they known of the fiduciary's
disloyalty because they would not have proceeded with the transaction.
The actor directly causing the substantial loss, however, is not the
fiduciary but a negligent third party.61 Should the fiduciary's liability to
compensate extend to losses traceable to the actions of the negligent
third party? One limiting principle is that a fiduciary undertakes to be
loyal within the scope of the relationship but not to be an insurer as to
all consequences that ultimately befall the beneficiary.62 This analysis, in
turn, presupposes that the fiduciary's commitment to be loyal is the
central and distinctive rationale for imposing the obligation.63
60 See, e-g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979), which provides that a person
standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting
from a breach of the duty imposed by the relationship; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
205(a) (1959), which provides that a trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with any
loss or depreciation in value of trust estates resulting from the breach.
61 See Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129,
which limited a defendant's liability to loss arising before intervention by negligent third parties.
Here, a solicitor failed to disclose to a client that property purchased by the client had passed
through an intermediate transaction. The client suffered enormous loss due to the negligence of a
soil engineer and a pile driver. This led to damage to a building constructed on property purchased
by the solicitor's client.
62 See, generally, Mr. Justice Gummow, "Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty" in T.G.
Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 57.
63 R. Cooter & BJ. Freedman, "The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences" (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045 at 1074. Here, the authors argue that the
mechanisms of enforcing a fiduciary obligation demonstrate a centrality of loyalty as a rationale for
obligation. Focussing on the centrality of loyalty has other consequences as well. If the
beneficiary's behaviour could be characterized as contributory negligence in a tort law framework,
that fact is irrelevant to assessing whether the fiduciary acted disloyally. See Gummow, supra note
62 at 86-87.
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Given the basic rationale for imposing fiduciary obligation, it is
regrettable that many recent corporation statutes, in defining directors'
duties to the corporation, avoid using words like fiduciary and loyalty,
instead casting directors' obligations in the language of good faith.64
What is the precise meaning of good faith in this context? The statutes
do not define it. Is a director who has a personal interest-whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary-in a transaction acting in good faith if he or
she participates as a director in making a decision about the transaction?
Is the director acting in good faith if he or she fails to disclose this
interest to fellow directors? Suppose the self-interested director fails to
disclose his or her interest but sincerely (and correctly) believes that the
transaction will prove beneficial to the corporation? Is the director
liable to account for any profit realized? 65
Along the same lines, at least one court has premised fiduciary
liability on its assessment of whether the defendant acted
opportunistically. In Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 66 the plaintiff, an
employee-at-will, bought shares in his employer subject to a condition
obliging him to sell the shares back at book value if his employment
terminated for any reason. After the plaintiff announced that he wished
to leave voluntarily for family reasons, officers of his employer did not
tell him that negotiations were under way which, if successful, would
64 See, eg., REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr, supra, note 17, § 8.30(a), which provides
that a director must discharge duties as a director: 1) in good faith, 2) with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and 3) in a manner he
or she reasonably believes to be in the corporation's best interests. To similar effect is the Business
CorporationsAc R.S.O. 1990, c. B-16, s. 134(1).
Indeed, the drafters of this revised model Act appear intimidated by the very words fiduciary
and loyalty, and cast directors' obligations in the language of good faith on the stated ground that
courts otherwise might mistakenly unleash the "unique attributes and obligations ... imposed by the
law of trusts." See the REVISED MODEL Busrm'ss CoR'. AcT, supra, § 8.30 & official comment.
Similarly, drafters working on the REVISED UNIFoRM PARNEasti' AcT appreciate the power of
fiduciary language and continue to dispute whether partners should be designated as fiduciaries in
the new statute. See D.J. Weidner, "Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform
Partnership Act" (1991) 46 Bus. Law. 427 at 456-59.
65 The revised model Act ultimately relegates the answer to this question to an inquiry into
whether the transaction was "fair to the corporation" at the time of its commitment to the
transaction. See the REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr, supra, note 17, § 8.61(b)(3), which the
official comment treats as encompassing "the behaviour of the director having the conflict" as well
as the "market fairness" of the price and the likelihood that the corporation would benefit from the
transaction.
66 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
[voi- 30 NO. 2
Fiduciary Obligation
lead to the merger of their company with another at a very favourable
price, one well above book value. The Court held that the officers'
failure to disclose the ongoing negotiations breached a fiduciary duty
owed to the plaintiff as a stockholder. Even though the plaintiff's status
as an employee-at-will would enable his employer to fire him for any
reason, the Court reasoned that the employer may not act
opportunistically to take advantage of the plaintiff. As a standard,
though, opportunism suggests that the defendant's motive or intention is
dispositive.
Perhaps these developments reflect discomfort with the austere
and uncompromised nature of fiduciary norms, comparable to the
evident discomfort with the exclusivity of fiduciary commitment
discussed earlier in this essay. Perhaps, as Professor Grant Gilmore
once predicted of contract law, fiduciary norms are being encroached
upon, if not yet overtaken by, tort law-driven standards that are sensitive
to questions of intent and motive.67 In retrospect, of course, Professor
Gilmore's prediction of the death of contract as a distinctive grouping of
legal doctrines was mistaken or, at best, premature. Fiduciary norms,
similarly, may prove to be resilient.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MANDATORY FIDUCIARY NORMS
Even if fiduciary norms are distinctive, what justifies the
mandatory imposition of any fiduciary rule? First, mandatory rules
supply standardized content for the legal consequences of relationships.
Enabling people to develop standardized expectations, in carefully
defined settings, can be efficient. The law of property defining estates in
land, for example, defines sets of highly standardized expectations that
enable transactions to proceed much more simply than would be the
case otherwise. A seller's warranty that the interest one is purchasing is
a fee simple does not eliminate all of a buyer's worries, but it furnishes a
standardized set, or a package, of expectations that reduces the buyer's
need to investigate, and the seller's need to describe, the precise rights
that the seller is, in fact, able to convey.
Mandatory fiduciary rules likewise reduce the need for highly
particularized investigations. In the absence of mandatory rules
6 7 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974).
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requiring candour and forbidding expropriation, a prospective partner
would need carefully to explore the propensities for deceit and self-
aggrandizement of each prospective fellow partner. Much of the
information needed to draft an agreement to protect oneself is likely to
be in the other person's possession. Only rarely do people wishing to
enter into long-term relationships with other people volunteer that their
true intentions are opportunistic and exploitative. Only on television
(and in some types of literature) do villains readily identify themselves
early in the plot. In this respect, life does not imitate art.
Outside the partnership context, consider for a moment the
utility of mandatory fiduciary norms in agency law. In their absence,
prospective principals, assuming they are cautious and prudent, would
want much information before engaging any particular agent to act on
their behalf. The legal consequences of agency explain this caution. An
agent has power to bind a principal to contracts made within the scope
of the agency relationship. If the agent appears to a third party to be
authorized, the principal may be bound even in the absence of actual
authority. Moreover, the principal may be vicariously liable for torts
committed by the agent acting within the scope of the relationship.
Agents who are free to profit from the relationship, with no duty to
account to the principal, may develop tastes for risky behaviour. At the
same time, the cautious prospective principal may be reluctant to
demonstrate potential vulnerability by bargaining too vigorously for a
high standard for the agent's conduct.68 Wouldn't the potentially
rapacious agent interpret the prospective principal's concern as a clue
that this principal will be especially ripe for exploitation? In the absence
of mandatory fiduciary norms, bargaining to define a relationship with,
for example, a real estate agent or a stockbroker, would be strategically
complex. Indeed, agents who are in fact honest and honourable might
welcome mandatory fiduciary rules due to the practical difficulties
otherwise of distinguishing themselves from their less trustworthy (but
subtle) competitors.
Mandatory fiduciary norms may also typify situations in which
ultimate beneficiaries of fiduciary protections are not likely to be in a
position to bargain with persons who manage property on their behalf.
68 For an analysis of strategic considerations in pre-contractual negotiations as they affect
incentives to disclose information, see J.S. Johnston, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules" (1990) 100 Yale LI. 615.
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Consider three settings in which Congress has, through federal
legislation, imposed mandatory fiduciary duties and defined their
content. E.R.I.S.A.69 imposes five affirmative fiduciary duties on
persons who control employee benefit plans, all of which are mandatory
and not subject to modification through provisions in the instrument
creating the plan.70 The TRUST IDENTu1 Acr OF 1939, as amended in 1990,
likewise characterizes an indenture trustee as a fiduciary and defines the
content of the duties the trustee owes to holders of debt securities issued
under the indenture.71 Finally, the INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
imposes a fiduciary duty on a mutual fund's investment advisor with
respect to payments the advisor receives for its services to the fund.72
Why are legislatively defined fiduciary norms mandatory in these three
diverse settings? In all three, the persons whose interests are protected
by the presence of fiduciary standards are not in a position, for one
reason or another, to bargain with the person to whom the fiduciary
standard applies. Participants in E.R.I.s.A.-governed plans may not even
be eligible employees when the plan's instruments are drawn. Likewise,
holders of debt securities are, by definition, not holders when the issuer's
management, the securities' underwriter, and the indenture trustee
negotiate the terms of the indenture. True, people who hold
investments in debt securities and mutual funds frequently-but not
always-acquire them voluntarily.73 That legislation makes the fiduciary
norms mandatory, however, demonstrates that acquiring an interest with
already defined rights (already defined by an instrument, that is) does
not always have the same significance as participating in bargaining over
those rights.
The ability to bargain to define the terms of a relationship,
however, leaves much unexplained. Even in settings in which parties
seem to have crafted provisions that foreseeably have predictable effects
if specific contingencies occur, some courts stress the need to evaluate
on a case-by-case basis whether parties' behaviour breached fiduciary
69 Supra, note 7.
70 See ibid. § ll0CA. See, generally, B. Krikorian, Fiduciary Standards in Pension and Trust
Fund Management (Stoneham: Butterworth, 1989).
71 See 15 U.S.C § 77ooo (1983), amended by, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (Supp. 1 1990).
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1989).
73 People who acquire securities through inheritance do not make a voluntary investment
choice, unless one is willing to give that effect to a decision not to disaffirm an inheritance.
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norms. In Smith v. Atlantic Properties,74 for example, the four
shareholders in a closely-held corporation adopted articles and by-laws
giving each shareholder a veto over all directors' decisions and over all
proposed share transfers. When his fellow shareholders vetoed one
shareholder's proposed transfer of shares to a foundation, he avenged
himself by vetoing all dividend distributions. The Court held the
vengeful director liable for the accumulated earnings penalty imposed
on the corporation by the Internal Revenue Service, finding that the
vengeful director "recklessly" ran "risks which were inconsistent with any
reasonable interpretation of a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty."75
Even though the vengeful use of the veto seems to have been a
foreseeable contingency, the Court expressly declined to endorse a
general relaxation of the "utmost good faith and loyalty" standard when
the parties themselves created the device that led to their predicament. 76
Retaining judicial prerogative to review parties' actual behaviour on a
case-by-case basis may be paternalistic, but it may also be a realistic
acknowledgement of people's ability to be caught by surprise when the
contingency they ignored, or they recognized but discounted, finally
materializes. Judicial paternalism may be something for which the self-
aware vulnerable party might bargain. The question raised by Smith, is
how best to define behaviour that suffices to bargain away fiduciary
protection?
To be sure, in some settings in which bargaining is unlikely, some
fiduciary norms are effectively treated as default rules. As discussed
above, many states' corporation statutes permit exculpatory provisions in
corporations' charters that reduce or eliminate directors' liability for
money damages for breaches of their duty of care. 77 One explanation
74 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) [hereinafter Smith].
75Ibid. at 803.
76]bid. at 803 n. 10.
77 These exculpatory clauses do not, of course, represent a complete opting out from the duty
of care; rather, they relieve directors of specified consequences-liability for money damages-if
they breach the duty. Thus, a third party who knowingly benefitted from the directors' breach could
be liable. An exculpatory clause, however, does not eradicate the duty itself. Such a clause would
not enable directors to contract away their duty to shareholders through express provisions in a
merger agreement that relieve directors of their duty to advise shareholders of the existence of a
higher offer for their stock. Compare Conagra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986).
Here, the Court granted summary judgment against a party to a negotiated merger agreement. The
plaintiff sued the directors of a merger partner who had cancelled a shareholders' meeting
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for this permissiveness is that other constraints-other than legal
enforcement of fiduciary norms-seem to work more effectively.78 In
particular, product markets and labour markets in many cases take their
own revenge on inept managers. Moreover, judicial enforcement of the
duty of care inevitably is inhibited by judges' reluctance to probe the
merits of business decisions.7 9 Each of the examples of legislatively
mandated fiduciary norms, moreover, is a statutory response to reports
of extensive abuses that occurred in the absence of mandatory fiduciary
norms.
Moreover, parties' relative ability to bargain does not seem to
explain the intensity with which courts articulate or apply fiduciary
norms. Courts especially stress the severity of fiduciary standards in
partnerships and closely-held corporations in which actual bargaining
over the terms of the parties' relationship is likely to occur, but not in
publicly-held corporations in which such bargaining is least likely. Judge
Cardozo emphasized that the fiduciary standard is one of a "punctilio of
an honour the most sensitive" in Meinhard v. Salmon,80 involving a two-
person joint venture in real estate. Thus, the parties' initial ability to
define their relationship through bargaining is not the sole explanatory
factor. If it were, courts would use the "punctilio" standard in evaluating
the stewardship of directors of publicly-held corporations, not the
actions of partners. In closely-held small ventures (whether organized as
partnerships or corporations), minority investors often lack realistic
opportunities to exit: the sole market for their investment interests is
likely to be the majority or controlling investor. Small closely-held
ventures also have dramatically different arrangements for internal
governance than do publicly-held corporations. In particular, small
ventures are unlikely to have independent directors accountable to the
interests of all investors. In short, despite their opportunity to bargain
initially, minority investors in small enterprises are more vulnerable to
scheduled to vote on the merger agreement, after a third party made a tender offer at a higher
price.
78 See Thompson,supra, note 32 at 407. Professor David Charney used a similar argument to
explain when nonlegal commitments should lead to legal liability: to the extent transacting parties
in a particular context would rely on non-legal sanctions to enforce the commitment, it should not
be treated as an enforceable contract term. See D. Charney, "Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships" (1990) 104 Harv. L Rev. 375 at 456-63.
79 See Thompson, ibid at 408.
80 Supra, note 14.
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subsequent overreaching by the majority. And overreaching behaviour
in a small venture seems to betray a more personalized relationship than
does the identical behaviour when a director of a publicly-held
corporation indulges in it.
Finally, to the extent fiduciary rules are characterized as default
rules, difficult questions arise concerning the evidence of agreement that
would suffice to vary the default norm. How much specificity should be
required (the question posed by Smith81)? Should a restraint like the
parol evidence rule apply? That is, should we almost always prefer the
written manifestation of an agreement over otherwise compelling
evidence that the parties reached a bargain-in-fact? In the absence of a
provision in a written instrument establishing an alternative to the
default rule, what evidence of agreement should suffice? Tolerance of
prior breaches of the default rule?82 Diffuse oral assurances ("Don't
worry about it. Trust me.")? Should the parties' sophistication be
relevant? Is it relevant whether the parties used legal counsel?
Resolving these difficult questions requires an expenditure of
resources not required by mandatory rules.83 Whether, on balance, the
expenditure is justified is a question that is not answered by taxonomic
arguments. We need to ask whether mandatory rules at present inhibit
transactions and relationships that would be beneficial to the
participants, perhaps not to each of them individually in each instance,
but to broad classes of participants over time. Argument-by-
classification is not responsive. Like argument-by-labelling the author,
84
it bypasses engagement with the merits of the issues at stake.
To be sure, taxonomy is useful. It is useful to have basic divisions
among legal categories, and analysis surely proceeds more expeditiously
81 Supra, note 74.
82 See, e-g., Re E.F. Hutton & Co., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,303 (S.E.C. July 6, 1988). Here, a sophisticated customer, who complained of the firm's earlier
failure to execute his limit orders, was entitled to disclosure of the firm's practice of giving priority
to proprietary trades when the firm accepted a particular limit order from the customer.
83 Compare Laniok v.Advisory Comm. of the Brainerd Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360
(2d Cir. 1991). This Court remanded for trial of factual issues requisite to a careful examination of
whether a 57-year-old employee knowingly and voluntarily waived participation in his new
employer's pension plan.
84 For a description and critique of the practice of argument-by-labelling the author (albeit in
a different substantive context), see S.L. Carter, "Academic Tenure and 'White Male' Standards:
Some Lessons from the Patent Law" (1991) 100 Yale LJ. 2065 at 2067-68.
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as a result of categorization.85 The examples of argument-by-taxonomy
explored in this essay illustrate taxonomy's chief weakness, its
artificiality. Used to resolve difficult questions, argument-by-taxonomy
seems an example of legal formalism at its worst. That is, taxonomic
arguments are mechanistic, in that the result follows inexorably from the
initial classification, follows as inexorably as the ticking of a mechanical
clock that is wound at regular intervals. Taxonomic argument
presupposes, additionally, a closed system of argument that forecloses
reference to any factors external to the scheme of categorization. In
short, it treats "as definitionally inexorable that which involves
nondefinitional, substantive choices. ' '8 6 Taxonomy furnishes starting
points but not answers. The evaluation of fiduciary norms requires
much more than simple taxonomy can provide.
In turn, identifying the central or distinctive justification for
fiduciary norms is often crucial to constructing and applying them in
particular contexts. Otherwise the norms-context-variable in any
event-seem vague and ill-defined, and sometimes over-stretched.
Fiduciary norms can best be justified as components of the legal
infrastructure that specifically support obligations of loyalty to persons
or entities other than oneself. It is not surprising that doctrines
protective of commitments to act loyally have evolved in a noticeably
context-and-fact specific manner; their nature invites and justifies close
judicial attention to the facts of particular controversies. Similarly,
fiduciary norms lose their bite when they are imposed on behalf of
beneficiaries whose interests systematically conflict. If fiduciary norms
are overextended, that vitiates their force and their undergirding of
commitments to act loyally, leaving a residue of empty, albeit emphatic,
rhetoric.
8 5 See AJ. Hirsh, "The Problem of the Insolvent Heir" (1989) 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587 at 654.
Hirsh writes that "[m]uch like the process of speciation in biology, the process of categorization in
law can generate analytical (as opposed to adaptive) efficiencies whose benefits outweigh their
costs."
86 See F. Schauer, "Formalism" (1988) 97 Yale LJ. 509 at 513.
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